Iran: the nuclear file, the ceasefire text and the succession
Three separate questions trade under one country's name - the material, the fighting and the succession - and the contracts routinely treat them as one. They resolve on different documents, and two of them currently have no verification at all.
At a glance
- Stockpile before the strikes
- 440.9 kg of UF6 at up to 60% U-235, plus 184.1 kg at up to 20% (IAEA)
- Verification status
- Iran suspended cooperation; inspectors have not seen the material since
- What the ceasefire covers
- No inspection provision, no IAEA access clause, no enrichment freeze
- Snapback
- Freezes assets abroad, halts arms transfers, penalises ballistic missile development
What the programme physically is
Enrichment raises the proportion of the uranium-235 isotope in a quantity of uranium. Natural uranium is about 0.7 per cent U-235; power reactors want a few per cent; research reactors use around 20 per cent; a weapon needs roughly 90. The work is done by centrifuge cascades, and the material moves through them as uranium hexafluoride gas - which is why every stockpile figure is quoted as kilograms of UF6 at a stated enrichment level rather than as kilograms of uranium.
The crucial and counter-intuitive fact is that the ladder is front-loaded. Most of the separative work required to reach weapons grade is already done by the time material reaches 20 per cent, and the step from 60 per cent to 90 is small in effort compared with everything below it. That is the entire reason 60 per cent is the number quoted in every report: it has no civilian justification at scale, and it sits one short step from the top of the ladder.
The quantities matter alongside the percentages. The agency's estimate before the June 2025 strikes was 440.9 kilograms of UF6 enriched to up to 60 per cent, and a further 184.1 kilograms at up to 20 per cent. Those two numbers are the reference points behind every market about surrendering or ending a stockpile, and they describe a state of affairs that no inspector has been able to confirm since.
1Natural uranium
About 0.7% U-235 — the starting point for every cascade
2Reactor grade
A few per cent; the level a power programme needs and can justify
320 per cent
Research-reactor fuel — and roughly where most of the separative work has already been done
The step that matters, and the one the public conversation skips
460 per cent
440.9 kg of UF6 at this level before the strikes; no civilian rationale at scale
590 per cent
Weapons grade — a short step in effort from the level already reached
Short in work, decisive in meaning
Most of the work is done below 20 per cent. That is why 60 is the reported number and why the gap between 60 and 90 is not the reassuring part.
The three questions trading under one name
The first is the material. Contracts ask whether Iran agrees to surrender its enriched stockpile or to end enrichment by a date. These resolve on an agreement text and, in principle, on verification - and verification is exactly what is currently missing, which makes the wording unusually load-bearing.
The second is the fighting. Contracts ask whether a ceasefire holds through a date, whether offensive operations are halted, or whether an invasion occurs before a deadline - the last of these being the single largest market in this domain by a wide margin. These are the hardest to write cleanly, because 'ceasefire holds' requires a definition of what breaks it, and the existing entry on ceasefire agreements covers that problem in general terms.
The third is the succession. A long ladder of contracts asks who will be head of state at the end of the year, naming individual candidates. These resolve on an office being held on a date, which sounds simple and is not: the Iranian system separates the supreme leadership from the presidency, so a contract that says 'leader' and a contract that says 'head of state' can be asking about two different offices held by two different people at the same moment.
- The material: an agreement text, plus verification that currently does not exist.
- The fighting: a definition of what counts as a breach.
- The succession: which office the contract actually names.
Which documents exist, and which do not
The International Atomic Energy Agency is the reference source and publishes verification and monitoring reports on a regular cycle. Those reports are where every stockpile figure in circulation originates, and independent institutes publish detailed analyses of them within days. When a number appears in coverage without a report behind it, it is almost always an older report's figure being re-quoted.
The gap is the important part. Iran suspended cooperation with the agency after the strikes, and inspectors have not seen the material since. Iran's foreign minister said in March 2026 that the enriched uranium lies under the rubble of the attacked facilities and that there is no plan to recover it. Whether that is accurate is not currently verifiable by anyone, which means a market on surrendering a stockpile is a market about material whose location and condition are asserted rather than observed.
The ceasefire text is the second document, and reading it is startling for anyone who assumed it addressed the nuclear question. It contains no provision for nuclear inspections, no IAEA access clause, no enrichment freeze and no safeguard mechanism. The fighting and the file were separated in the agreement, and treating a durable ceasefire as evidence about the nuclear contracts is therefore a category error the market makes routinely.
For the sanctions leg, the snapback mechanism is a defined legal instrument rather than a policy posture: it freezes Iranian assets abroad, halts arms transfers and penalises ballistic missile development. Its trigger and its effects are written down, which makes sanctions contracts the most cleanly settleable of the four families.
- IAEA verification and monitoring reports: the origin of every stockpile figure.
- The ceasefire text: silent on inspections, access, enrichment and safeguards.
- Snapback: a defined instrument with written triggers and effects.
Behind the subscription
The rest of this entry is the part that changes a decision: what moves the price, which contract sets it, who ships it and where that can be cut off.
What moves these markets
Why restored verification access would reprice every material contract at once, how a breach definition decides a ceasefire market before any event does, and why exiled and internal succession candidates are not comparable propositions.
Where the same risk is priced
How to read oil options skew against an escalation contract, why war-risk insurance premiums are a more concrete signal than equities, and which political events exist only on prediction markets.
How the pressure is actually applied
Why banking access rather than trade bans is the real sanctions mechanism, why export volumes exceed what restrictions imply, and why the chokepoint threat has been worth more than its execution.
How to approach these contracts
The four-family sort that stops one view being held four times, the verification question that decides every material contract, and the constitutional check to run on a named succession candidate.
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Frequently asked questions
- Why is 60 per cent enrichment the number everyone quotes?
- Because the enrichment ladder is front-loaded. Most of the separative work needed to reach weapons grade is done below 20 per cent, so material at 60 per cent sits a short step in effort from 90. It also has no civilian justification at scale, which is why its presence is reported rather than its absence.
- Where is Iran's enriched uranium now?
- Not independently known. The agency's pre-strike estimate was 440.9 kilograms of UF6 at up to 60 per cent and 184.1 kilograms at up to 20 per cent. Iran suspended cooperation afterwards and inspectors have not seen the material since; Iran's foreign minister said in March 2026 that it lies under the rubble and that there is no plan to recover it.
- Does the ceasefire cover the nuclear programme?
- No. The agreement contains no provision for nuclear inspections, no IAEA access clause, no enrichment freeze and no safeguard mechanism. Treating a durable ceasefire as evidence about the nuclear contracts confuses two questions that were deliberately separated.
- What are snapback sanctions?
- A defined mechanism that freezes Iranian assets abroad, halts arms transfers and penalises ballistic missile development. Because its triggers and effects are written down and its designations are published, sanctions contracts are the most cleanly settleable of the Iran families.
- Why do the leadership markets name people who are not in government?
- Because several of them are pricing a change of system rather than a change of officeholder. The supreme leadership and the presidency are separate offices with separate selection processes, and a candidate with no constitutional pathway to either is a different proposition from one already inside the system.
Primary sources
- Arms Control Association — The status of Iran's nuclear program
- Congressional Research Service — Iran and nuclear weapons production
- Institute for Science and International Security — Analysis of IAEA Iran verification and monitoring reports, June 2026
- Al Jazeera — UN watchdog demands Iran provide information on nuclear stockpile
- Al Jazeera — Iran's enriched uranium stockpile: can it be safely transferred?
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